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ANDENAES AND THE THEORY OF DETERRENCE* 
LARRY I. PALMER** 
For at least two reasons, American scholars 
engaged in an expanding area of criminal law 
related research cannot a.fford to ignore this 
book by the noted Norwegian criminologist 
and lawyer. First, Andenaes' pioneering work 
was initially critical of the then predominant 
theme in American criminology that treated 
the issue of deterrence as one unworthy of se-
rious intellectual consideration.1 Careful read-
ing of his book will convince all but the die-
hard disbelievers that punishment and 
deterrence must once again assume a central 
role in scholarly discussion of the criminal 
law. Second, perhaps because of increasing 
skepticism of the efficacy of "treatment" as a 
justification for the law's control over the indi-
vidual among lawyers, jurists, and the public, 
the time has arrived for the idea of deterrence, 
and thus for Andenaes' book. Scholars must 
now refine and address the problem of deter-
rence that has always been foremost in the pub-
lic's mind in its view of the purposes of the 
criminallaw.2 
The major contribution of Andenaes' book, a 
collection of essays written over the past 
twenty years, is its coherent and analytical def-
inition of deterrence. It is not surprising that 
some of the essays as previously published 
have already had substantial influence on crim-
inal law-related scholarship.3 The book's infiu-
* A review article of PUNISHMENT AND DETER-
RENCE. By Johannes Andenaes. Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1974. Pp. vi, 189. 
$9.00. 
**Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers-Cam-
den Law School. 
1 }. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 
1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ANDENAES, PuN-
ISHMENT]. 
2 As Andenaes points out, a large portion of the 
public and public officials take the deterrence po-
tential of the law very seriously. 
3See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE 
ence on public policy discussion may be dor-
mant or emerge indirectly through the other 
scholarship that has been and will be inspired 
by its conceptual framework and research 
questions. Legislators, jurists, police officers, 
and sentencing and correctional officials are 
now debating the law's ability to deter certain 
conduct and the efficacy and legitimacy of pun-
ishment. It is hoped that those policy makers 
will eventually have some notion of Andenaes' 
concept of deterrence as an analytical starting 
point of their discussions. 
.On the assumption that various notions of 
deterrence will have enduring influence on 
public policy and scholarship, a reviewer has a 
special obligation to make both explanatory 
and critical judgments about such a complete 
exposition on the subject as Andenaes' book. 
That obligation will be fulfilled in two ways. 
The analytical definition of deterrence, care-
fully developed in the series of essays, will be 
described. As will be demonstrated, this defini-
tion is in fact an analytical perspective on the 
purposes and justification of the criminal law. 
Second, to demonstrate both the power and the 
limits of his analytical framework, I will uti-
lize the book's concepts to illuminate issues 
often hidden in contemporary debates about the 
criminal law. I will use the examples of the 
debate over the efficacy of certain rules to 
deter police from certain kinds of behavior and 
the controversy over the "fairness" of Lieuten-
ant William Calley's conviction, sentence, and 
parole for his participation in the My Lai 
Massacre during the war in Vietnam. This 
examination of the limits of the analysis is in 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 370 (1968); F. ZIMRING 
AND G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL 
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973). 
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fact a tribute to Andenaes' intellectual powers 
since the questions his analysis cannot answer 
are enduring ones for those seriously engaged 
in criminal law scholarship. 
Andenaes writes for an audience, American 
social scientists and academic lawyers, which 
he assumes is either disinclined towards any 
notion of deterrence or so oriented toward re-
form and rehabilitation that any notion of de-
terrence is almost foreign and certainly 
archaic.4 The organization of the essays with 
the three accompanying appendices is designed 
to convince this skeptical audience of the 
soundness of Andenaes' position that punish-
ment and deterrence should be a primary justi-
fication for the criminal law. First, he bridges 
the gap between his own perspective and that 
of his audience by translating and explaining 
the centinental term, "General Prevention," 
into the more familiar terminology for Ameri-
can readers, "General Deterrence." 5 Second, 
he establishes the difference between special 
and general deterrence in clear terms. He then 
proceeds to demonstrate what claims can be 
made for special and general deterrence. It is 
the latter phenomenon that is Andenaes' pri-
mary concern in his first two essays.6 
General deterrence is an inclusive term that 
means for Andenaes the ability of "the crimi-
nal law and its enforcement to make citizens 
law-abiding." 7 By use of this general concept 
that is focused upon the behavior of the citi-
zenry rather than solely on those small num-
bers who violate the law and are apprehended, 
his concept of deterrence includes several dis-
tinct features. The general deterrence includes 
not only psychological dimensions of the threat 
or fear of punishment, but also the perceived 
risk .of detection. In addition, the term includes 
the ability of the law to strengthen other inhi-
bitions by performing a moralizing and educa-
4 Since nearly all the essays appeared originally 
in American journals over the years, Andenaes's 
assumption about American academic audiences 
may not hold today. As American audiences grow 
more familiar with his work, his well-argued po-
sition for deterrence must become more analytical. 
5 .ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT at 3-33, 173-74. 
s .ANnENAES, PuNISHMENT, Chapter I, "General 
Prevention-Illusion or Reality,'' 3-33; Chapter II, 
"The General-Preventive Effects of Punishment." 
34-83. 
1 Id. at 7. 
tive function.8 With such an all inclusive defi-
nition, the problem of general deterrence is not 
merely one of empiricism9 for Andenaes, but 
one of values10 and specification of conditions 
imder which the law's general deterrence func-
tions can be realized. 
In any such attempted delineation of issues 
the distinction between the various aspects of 
the deterrent effect of the law and its effect 
upon the individual offender-special or indi-
vidual deterrence-must be made. Most of 
American scholarship has focused generally on 
the problem of deterrence.11 Once Andenaes is 
convinced that his reluctant reader is per-
suaded of the necessity to be more precise in 
any claims for or against general or specific 
deterrence, he illustrates the utility of the dis-
tinction in his third essay entitled, "Deterrence 
and Specific Offenses."12 His fourth essay at-
tempts to deal explicitly with the moral and 
educative aspects of deterrence.18 While admit-
tedly repetitious for readers already familiar 
with Andenaes' work, the message is clear that 
discussion of deterrence must become more 
precise.14 
Andenaes, of course, believes that we know 
more about the general deterrence effect of the 
criminal law from common sense reasoning 
than most scholars have been willing to admit. 
He is not, however, insensitive to the ethical 
questions raised by the notion of general de-
terrence. The reluctance of scholars to give de-
terrence serious consideration in the past may 
have been due to their discomfort with the no-
SJd. 
9 ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT. 
10 I d. at 77. 
11 While Andenaes may be correct that crimi-
nologists are "treatment oriented," one group of 
American social scientists, economists, are becom-
ing aware of the law's deterrent potential. See, e.g., 
Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law 
Et~forcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 259 (1972). 
12 ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT at 84-107. 
18 ANDENAES, PuNISHMENT, Chapter IV, "The 
Moral of Educative Influence of Criminal Law," 
11(}..28. 
14 It is also possible that Andenaes' classification 
of the various categories of offenses could be chal-
lenged. Id. at 86. I am particularly concerned with 
whether his distinction between what he calls "police 
regulations" and "economics crimes" hold law. This 
review is not the place to attempt to consider when, 
and under what circumstances Americans use legal 
regulation rather than criminal sanctions, and how 
the regulation and criminal sanction interact. 
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tion of using one individual as a means of 
keeping others law-abiding.15 He addresses this 
ethical concern of scholars in his fifth essay, 
"The Morality of Deterrence."16 It is in this 
essay that the reader is made acutely aware of 
how the ethical issues differ for legislators and 
sentencing officials.17 The legislator must con-
sider the general deterrence effect in enacting 
laws, but whether and under what conditions 
the sentencing officials should consider general 
deterrence is a more difficult ethical issue.18 It 
is also in, thiS~ essay that the more careful 
reader will have an inkling of Andenaes' more 
generalized theory or perspective on the crimi-
nal law.19 
The final essay is "The Future of the Crimi-
nal Law." 20 The only essay that has not been 
previously published, it is essentially an exe-
gesis of how central Andenaes thinks the con-
cept of deterrence is to a host of problems in 
criminal law. For instance, in deciding 
whether there ought to be a move towards 
shorter or longer sentences, his analysis, which 
includes a critique of existing research, leads 
towards shorter sentences. His suggestion here 
ought to be given serious attention by re-
searchers and policy makers. As with all good 
analytical work, all his essays, particularly 
those in the last appendix21 are sprinkled with 
critical research questions which ought to be 
refined and addressed by American scholars. 
Until Americans become at least as critical 
and precise as Andenaes in their use of the 
concept of deterrence, our public and scholarly 
debates will add very little to his pioneering 
theoretical work. Judicial and scholarly debate 
over the deterrent effect of the fourth amend-
1s I d. at 129. 
1s I d. at 129-51. 
1 7 ld. at 135. 
IS I d. at 135. 
19 Readers familiar with the debates in Ameri-
can criminal law will find Andenaes' discussion of 
risks of litigation inadequate. Id. at 78, 146. For 
instance, Andenaes does not discuss how the lack 
of review of sentence in most American jurisdic-
tions creates a host of institutional problems. See 
note 29 infra. But the inadequacy here is well com-
pensated by the richness of his insights from the 
Scandinavian experience. 
,20 ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT at 152-72. 
-21 I d. at 183-89. "The Relevance of Psycholog-
ical Research for Deliverance Theory" has great 
relevance to questions of the permissibility of 
using scientific behavior control in prisons. 
ment's exclusionary rule22 is an excellent ex-
ample of our present confusion about the con-
cept of deterrence in general. Most participants 
in this debate fail to include in their discussion 
an explicit treatment of the issue of 
"punishment" of police officers.23 Assuming 
that some aspect of visiting sanctions upon the 
wrongdoer is involved in the rule of exclu-
sion, few participants question why the sanc-
tion should in fact fall on the prosecutor rather 
than the police. The jurists, as one would ex-
pect from Andenaes' analysis, are at least a bit 
more aware that they are considering the 
moralizing and educative function of the rule 
of exclusion on police officers who are part of 
the citizenry. 24 If it is the moralizing effect of 
law that is in question, a better analysis in-
volves the value conflicts that jurists must 
make in deciding these cases, rather than on 
whether we can measure the number of "illegal 
searches" before and after the rule.2S Ande-
naes' concept of deterrence is broad enough to 
2z See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Escltesio11ary 
Rule it~ Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 
665, 670-72 (1970). 
23 The notion of condemning the police officer 
seems to arise when the jurists debate whether 
"good faith" or technical violations of the "illegal 
search and seizure" doctrine ought to lead to ex-
clusion in a given case. 
24 Even an opponent of the exclusionary rule, 
Chief Justice Burger, appears to recognize the ed-
ucative influences of the judicial rule. He has 
stated in the course of a critique of the rule: 
I do not propose, however, that we aban-
don the suppression doctrine until some mean-
ingful alternative can be developed. In a sense 
our legal system has become the captive of its 
own creation. To overrule Weeks and Mapp, 
even assuming the Court was now prepared to 
take that step, could raise new problems. Ob-
viously the public interest would be poorly 
served if law enforcement officials were sud-
denly to gain the impression, however erro-
neous, that all constitutional restraints on po-
lice had somewhere been removed-that an 
open season on "criminals" had been declared. 
I am concerned lest some such mistaken im-
pression might be fostered by a fiat overruling 
of the suppression doctrine cases. For years we 
have relied upon it as the exclusive remedy for 
unlawful official conduct; in a sense we are in 
a situation akin to the narcotics addict whose 
dependence on drugs precludes any drastic or 
immediate withdrawal of the supposed prop, 
regardless of how futile its continued use may 
be. 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1970) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
2s See note 22 suPra. 
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be translated into an operational and concep-
tual framework for rethinking the issue of the 
use of law to control state officials from imper-
missible, although not criminal, conduct.26 
Recent discussion of the "fairness" of inflic-
tion of sanctions on Lt. William Calley, espe-
cially among the "liberal minded and 
educated"27 miss Andenaes' analytical distinc-
tions in talking about deterrence. Those who 
claimed at one time that it was "unfair" to 
punish Calley because other wrongdoers are 
free, 26 failed to perceive that their opponents 
spoke explicitly about the moralizing and edu-
cative effect of the criminallaw.29 
With a clearer delineation of the issues, we 
might have had more cogent debate over 
whether the general deterrence effect can be 
achieved through an adjudication of Calley's 
crimes and a short sentence. In other words, is 
the need for general deterrence met by a short 
prison sentence in his case? While Andenaes' 
2s What is often implicit in Andenaes' book is 
the idea that other types of legal schemes other 
than criminal law ought to be examined in any 
discussion of the deterrent effect of the criminal 
law. See, e.g., ANDENAES, PuNISHMENT at 76, 125. 
\¥hen dealing with deterring non-criminal conduct, 
it is apparent that jurists do not think of deter-
rence in a mechanical fashion. See Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1970). At some point the 
deterrent effect of mere regulation of such various 
activities as drugs and alcohol ought to be critically 
examined. 
21 ANDENAES, PuNISHMENT at 133. 
2s Marshall, We Must End the War, N.Y. Times, 
April 10, 1971, at 23, col. 3. 
29 Goldstein, The Meaning of Calley, 190 THE 
NEW REPUBLIC, May 8, 1971, at 13, 14. 
* * * 
work cannot answer that question, his analysis 
would provide support for those ·seeking to 
justify punishment in terms of retribution or 
the need to deter Calley (special deterrence). 
For criminologists, the book is probably the 
modern statement on the problem of deter-
rence. For lawyers concerned with cases30 and 
legislation, the book must become a corner-
stone in modern scholarship. For too long, 
Americans have let notions of "individual-
ization" of the criminal law mask the difficult 
questions that general deterrence raises.31 
While the book is surely for scholars in terms 
of its depth, it is certainly well written enough 
for students in various disciplines, as well as 
for the lay reader. Ordinarily, I would prefer 
not to see things in print reprinted as books, 
but this collection of essays is well worth the 
effort of reprinting and adaptation since read 
together the essays form a coherent book. My 
only regret is that this is one of the few mod-
ern statements on deterrence. We desperately 
need more theoretical as well as empirical 
work in this area. For those already aware of 
Andenaes' work, the book breaks no new 
ground and adds no new theoretical insights. 
For those unfamiliar with his work, the collec-
tion presents his position in a coherent fashion. 
so Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) 
(White, ]., concurring) (constitutionality of the 
death penalty). 
s1 See, generally, Frankel, Lawlessness in Sen-
tencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1972) ; Palmer, A 
Model of Criminal Dispositiot~: An Alternative to 
Official Discretion in Sentencing, 62 GEo. L.J. 1 
(1973). 
* * 
